Four disputed Kuril Islands. History of the Kuril Islands. Kuril Islands in the history of Russian-Japanese relations. Kuril Islands for you, Sakhalin for us

The dispute over the southernmost Kuril Islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai - has been a point of tension between Japan and Russia since they were captured by the Soviet Union in 1945. More than 70 years later, Russian-Japanese relations are still not normal due to the ongoing territorial dispute. To a large extent, it was historical factors that prevented the solution of this issue. These include demographics, mentality, institutions, geography and economics—all of which encourage tough policies rather than compromise. The first four factors contribute to the continuation of the impasse, while the economy in the form of oil policy is associated with some hope of resolution.

Russia's claims to the Kuril Islands date back to the 17th century, resulting from periodic contacts with Japan through Hokkaido. In 1821, a de facto border was established, according to which Iturup became Japanese territory, and Russian land began with the island of Urup. Subsequently, according to the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), all four islands were recognized as Japanese territory. The last time the Kuril Islands changed their owner was as a result of World War II - in 1945 in Yalta, the Allies essentially agreed to transfer these islands to Russia.

The dispute over the islands became part of Cold War politics during the negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2c of which forced Japan to renounce all its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the Soviet Union's refusal to sign this agreement left these islands in a state of uncertainty. In 1956, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, which de facto meant the end of the state of war, but could not resolve the territorial conflict. After the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, further negotiations ceased, and this continued until the 1990s.

However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, a new opportunity to resolve this issue seemed to arise. Despite the turbulent events in world affairs, the positions of Japan and Russia on the Kuril Islands issue have not undergone much change since 1956, and the reason for this situation was five historical factors outside the Cold War.

The first factor is demographic. Japan's population is already declining due to low birth rates and aging, while Russia's population has been declining since 1992 due to excess alcohol consumption and other social ills. This shift, coupled with the weakening of international influence, has led to the emergence of backward-looking trends, and both nations are now largely trying to resolve the issue by looking back rather than forward. Given these attitudes, it can be concluded that the aging populations of Japan and Russia are making it impossible for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Vladimir Putin to negotiate due to their deeply entrenched views on the Kuril Islands issue.

Context

Is Russia ready to return the two islands?

Military construction in the Kuril Islands

Is it possible to agree on the Kuril Islands?

The perception of Japan in Russia was largely shaped by the issue of the Kuril Islands, and this continued until the end of the Cold War. Anti-Japanese propaganda became common after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and it was intensified by Japanese intervention during the Russian Civil War (1918–1922). This led many Russians to believe that as a result, all previously concluded treaties were annulled. However, Russia's victory over Japan in World War II ended the previous humiliation and strengthened the symbolic significance of the Kuril Islands, which came to represent (1) the irreversibility of the results of World War II and (2) Russia's status as a great power. From this point of view, the transfer of territory is seen as a revision of the outcome of the war. Therefore, control of the Kuril Islands remains of great psychological importance for the Russians.

Japan is trying to define its place in the world as a “normal” state, located next to an increasingly powerful China. The issue of the return of the Kuril Islands is directly related to the national identity of Japan, and these territories themselves are perceived as the last symbol of defeat in World War II. The Russian offensive and seizure of Japan's "inalienable territory" contributed to the victim mentality that became the dominant narrative after the end of the war.

This attitude is reinforced by Japan's conservative media, which often supports the government's foreign policies. In addition, nationalists often use the media to viciously attack academics and politicians who hint at the possibility of compromise on the issue, leaving little room for maneuver.

This, in turn, influences the political institutions of both Japan and Russia. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin's position was so weak that he feared possible impeachment if the Kuril Islands were transferred to Japan. At the same time, the central Russian government was weakened as a result of the growing influence of regional politicians, including two governors of the Sakhalin region - Valentin Fedorov (1990 - 1993) and Igor Fakhrutdinov (1995 - 2003), who actively opposed the possible sale of the Kuril Islands to Japan. They relied on nationalist feelings, and this was enough to prevent the completion of the treaty and its implementation in the 1990s.

Since President Putin came to power, Moscow has brought regional governments under its influence, but other institutional factors have also contributed to the stalemate. One example is the idea that a situation must mature before some issue or problem can be resolved. During the initial period of his rule, President Putin had the opportunity, but did not have the desire, to negotiate with Japan over the Kuril Islands. Instead, he decided to spend his time and energy trying to resolve the Sino-Russian border conflict through the issue of the Kuril Islands.

Since returning to the presidency in 2013, Putin has become increasingly dependent on the support of nationalist forces, and it is unlikely that he will be willing to cede the Kuril Islands in any meaningful sense. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine clearly demonstrate how far Putin is willing to go to protect Russia's national status.

Japanese political institutions, although they differ from Russian ones, also support a tough course of action in negotiations regarding the Kuril Islands. As a result of reforms carried out after the end of World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) occupies a dominant position in Japan. With the exception of the period from 1993 to 1995 and from 2009 to 2012, the LDP has had and continues to have a majority in the national legislative assembly, and in fact its party platform on the return of the four southern islands of the Kuril chain has been an integral part of national policy since 1956.

Moreover, as a result of the 1990-1991 real estate crash, the Liberal Democratic Party has produced only two effective prime ministers, Koizumi Junichiro and Shinzo Abe, both of whom rely on nationalist support to maintain their positions. Finally, regional politics plays an important role in Japan, and elected politicians on the island of Hokkaido are pushing the central government to take an assertive stance in the dispute. Taken together, all these factors are not conducive to reaching a compromise that would include the return of all four islands.

Sakhalin and Hokkaido emphasize the importance of geography and regional interests in this dispute. Geography influences how people see the world and how they observe policy formation and implementation. Russia's most important interests are in Europe, followed by the Middle East and Central Asia, and only after that Japan. Here is one example: Russia devotes a significant part of its time and effort to the issue of NATO expansion to the east, into the eastern part of Europe, as well as the negative consequences associated with the events in Crimea and Ukraine. As for Japan, for it the alliance with the United States, China and the Korean Peninsula have a higher priority than relations with Moscow. The Japanese government must also heed public pressure to resolve issues with North Korea over kidnapping and nuclear weapons, which Abe has promised to do several times. As a result, the issue of the Kuril Islands is often relegated to the background.

Probably the only factor contributing to a possible resolution of the Kuril Islands issue is economic interests. After 1991, both Japan and Russia entered a period of prolonged economic crisis. The Russian economy hit its lowest point during its currency crisis in 1997, and is currently facing serious difficulties due to the collapse of oil prices and economic sanctions. However, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, during which Japanese capital and Russian natural resources are combined, contributes to cooperation and the possible resolution of the issue of the Kuril Islands. Despite the sanctions imposed, 8% of Japan's oil consumption in 2014 was imported from Russia, and the increase in oil and natural gas consumption is largely due to the consequences of the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

Taken together, historical factors largely determine the continued stagnation in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands. Demographics, geography, political institutions, and the attitudes of Japanese and Russian citizens all contribute to a tough negotiating position. Oil policy provides some incentives for both nations to resolve disputes and normalize relations. However, this has not yet been enough to break the deadlock. Despite the possible change of leaders around the world, the main factors that have driven this dispute to an impasse will most likely remain unchanged.

Michael Bacalu is a member of the Council on Asian Affairs. He received a master's degree in international relations from Seoul University, South Korea, and a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Arcadia University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author as an individual and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he has an association.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

The authorities of Russia and Japan have been unable to sign a peace treaty since 1945 due to a dispute over the ownership of the southern part of the Kuril Islands.

The Northern Territories Problem (北方領土問題 Hoppo ryo do mondai) is a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia that Japan considers unresolved since the end of World War II. After the war, all the Kuril Islands came under the administrative control of the USSR, but a number of the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir and the Lesser Kuril Ridge - are disputed by Japan. In Russia, the disputed territories are part of the Kuril and South Kuril urban districts of the Sakhalin region. Japan claims four islands in the southern part of the Kuril ridge - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, citing the bilateral Treaty on Trade and Borders of 1855. Moscow's position is that the southern Kuril Islands became part of the USSR (which Russia became the successor of) results of the Second World War, and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the appropriate international legal registration, is beyond doubt. The problem of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands is the main obstacle to the complete settlement of Russian-Japanese relations.

Iturup(Japanese: 択捉島 Etorofu) is an island in the southern group of the Great Kuril Islands, the largest island of the archipelago.

Kunashir(Ainu Black Island, Japanese 国後島 Kunashiri-to:) is the southernmost island of the Great Kuril Islands.

Shikotan(Japanese 色丹島 Sikotan-to:?, in early sources Sikotan; name from the Ainu language: “shi” - large, significant; “kotan” - village, city) is the largest island of the Lesser Ridge of the Kuril Islands.

Habomai(Japanese 歯舞群島 Habomai-gunto?, Suisho, “Flat Islands”) is the Japanese name for a group of islands in the northwest Pacific Ocean, together with the island of Shikotan in Soviet and Russian cartography, considered as the Lesser Kuril Ridge. The Habomai group includes the islands of Polonsky, Oskolki, Zeleny, Tanfilyeva, Yuri, Demina, Anuchina and a number of small ones. Separated by the Soviet Strait from the island of Hokkaido.

History of the Kuril Islands

17th century
Before the arrival of the Russians and Japanese, the islands were inhabited by the Ainu. In their language, “kuru” meant “a person who came from nowhere,” which is where their second name “Kurilians” came from, and then the name of the archipelago.

In Russia, the first mention of the Kuril Islands dates back to 1646, when N. I. Kolobov spoke about the bearded people inhabiting the islands ainah. The Japanese received the first information about the islands during an expedition [source not specified 238 days] to Hokkaido in 1635. It is not known whether she actually got to the Kuril Islands or learned about them indirectly, but in 1644 a map was drawn up on which they were designated under the collective name “thousand islands.” Candidate of Geographical Sciences T. Adashova notes that the map of 1635 “is considered by many scientists to be very approximate and even incorrect.” Then, in 1643, the islands were explored by the Dutch led by Martin Friese. This expedition compiled more detailed maps and described the lands. XVIII century
In 1711, Ivan Kozyrevsky went to the Kuril Islands. He visited only 2 northern islands: Shumshu and Paramushira, but he questioned in detail the Ainu who inhabited them and the Japanese who were brought there by a storm. In 1719, Peter I sent an expedition to Kamchatka under the leadership of Ivan Evreinov and Fyodor Luzhin, which reached the island of Simushir in the south. In 1738-1739, Martyn Shpanberg walked along the entire ridge, plotting the islands he encountered on the map. Subsequently, the Russians, avoiding dangerous voyages to the southern islands, developed the northern ones and imposed tribute on the local population. From those who did not want to pay it and went to distant islands, they took amanats - hostages from among their close relatives. But soon, in 1766, centurion Ivan Cherny from Kamchatka was sent to the southern islands. He was ordered to attract the Ainu into citizenship without the use of violence or threats. However, he did not follow this decree, mocked them, and poached. All this led to a revolt of the indigenous population in 1771, during which many Russians were killed. The Siberian nobleman Antipov achieved great success with the Irkutsk translator Shabalin. They managed to win the favor of the Kurils, and in 1778-1779 they managed to bring into citizenship more than 1,500 people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Matsumaya (now Japanese Hokkaido). In the same 1779, Catherine II, by decree, freed those who had accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes. But relations with the Japanese were not built: they forbade the Russians from going to these three islands. In the “Extensive Land Description of the Russian State...” of 1787, a list of 21 islands belonging to Russia was given. It included islands up to Matsumaya (Hokkaido), the status of which was not clearly defined, since Japan had a city in its southern part. At the same time, the Russians had no real control even over the islands south of Urup. There, the Japanese considered the Kurilians their subjects and actively used violence against them, which caused discontent. In May 1788, a Japanese merchant ship arriving at Matsumai was attacked. In 1799, by order of the central government of Japan, two outposts were founded in Kunashir and Iturup, and security began to be maintained constantly. 19th century
Representative of the Russian-American Company Nikolai Rezanov, who arrived in Nagasaki as the first Russian envoy, tried to resume negotiations on trade with Japan in 1805. But he too failed. However, Japanese officials, who were not satisfied with the despotic policy of the supreme power, hinted to him that it would be nice to carry out a forceful action in these lands, which could push the situation from a dead point. This was carried out on behalf of Rezanov in 1806-1807 by an expedition of two ships led by Lieutenant Khvostov and Midshipman Davydov. Ships were looted, a number of trading posts were destroyed, and a Japanese village on Iturup was burned. They were later tried, but the attack led to a serious deterioration in Russian-Japanese relations for some time. In particular, this was the reason for the arrest of Vasily Golovnin’s expedition. In exchange for ownership of southern Sakhalin, Russia transferred all of the Kuril Islands to Japan in 1875.

XX century
After defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Russia transferred the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan.
In February 1945, the Soviet Union promised the United States and Great Britain to start a war with Japan, subject to the return of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
February 2, 1946. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the inclusion of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into the RSFSR.
1947. Deportation of Japanese and Ainu from the islands to Japan. 17,000 Japanese and an unknown number of Ainu were evicted.
November 5, 1952. A powerful tsunami hit the entire coast of the Kuril Islands, Paramushir was hit the hardest. A giant wave washed away the city of Severo-Kurilsk (formerly Kashiwabara). It was forbidden to mention this disaster in the press.
In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted the Joint Treaty, officially ending the war between the two countries and handing over Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. However, it was not possible to sign the agreement: the United States threatened not to give Japan the island of Okinawa if Tokyo renounced its claims to Iturup and Kunashir.

Maps of the Kuril Islands

Kuril Islands on the English map of 1893. Plans of the Kuril Islands, from sketches chiefly mand by Mr. H. J. Snow, 1893. (London, Royal Geographical Society, 1897, 54×74 cm)

Fragment of the map Japan and Korea - Location of Japan in the Western Pacific (1:30 000 000), 1945

Photo map of the Kuril Islands based on a NASA satellite image, April 2010.

List of all islands

View of Habomai from Hokkaido
Green Island (Japanese: Shibotsu-to)
Polonsky Island (Japanese: 多楽島 Taraku-to)
Tanfilyeva Island (Japanese: 水晶島 Suisho-jima)
Yuri Island (Japanese: 勇留島 Yuri-to)
Anuchina Island (秋勇留島 Akiyuri-to)
Demina Islands (Japanese: 春苅島 Harukari-to)
Shard Islands
Rock Kira
Cave Rock (Kanakuso) - sea lion rookery on the rock.
Sail Rock (Hokoki)
Rock Candle (Rosoku)
Fox Islands (Todo)
Cone Islands (Kabuto)
Jar Dangerous
Watchman Island (Khomosiri or Muika)

Drying Rock (Odoke)
Reef Island (Amagi-sho)
Signal Island (Japanese: 貝殻島 Kaigara-jima)
Amazing Rock (Hanare)
Rock Seagull

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Habomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge is 1,200 km long and stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. The southern islands have forests, while the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin region (Russian Federation). They are divided into three regions: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these areas have the corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous and volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The predominant heights are 500-1000m. An exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by low-mountain terrain formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The highest peak of the Kuril Islands is the Alaid volcano - 2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity causes constant threats of earthquakes and tsunamis.

Population -76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because The main natural wealth is marine bioresources. Agriculture did not receive significant development due to unfavorable natural conditions.

On the Kuril Islands, deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements contained in them - indium, helium, thallium - have been discovered, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a fairly high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport connections are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular shipping ceases. Due to difficult weather conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

During the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, a “policy of self-isolation” was announced. On pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Foreign ships were almost not allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, led by Moskvitin, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks left Yakutsk and made a difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya River, to the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk. The first Russian villages (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to travel along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643; at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov’s detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. At the beginning of September, the Cossacks saw the Amur estuary for the first time. From here the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they received the idea of ​​as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov to be the “discoverer of Sakhalin,” despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then, the Amur has acquired great importance, not only as a “river of grain”, but also as a natural communication. After all, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the fall of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived in the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that already in the second half of the 17th century the Russian people could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new twist in history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the required number of people and funds to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomacy did not bring success. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the “first discovery” of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why didn’t the Chinese take advantage of such a favorable situation and colonize Primorye, Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were prohibited from crossing the Great Wall of China! And in the absence of “their fair half,” the Chinese could not firmly establish themselves in these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.”

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Peace, the sea route remained the most convenient road to Sakhalin for the Russian people. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean became regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky made expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they obtained detailed information about most of the Kuril Islands and the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin carried out, by order of Peter I, a survey of the northern part of the Great Kuril Ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the 18th century there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

“Thus,” notes V. Shishchenko, “by the middle of the 18th century an amazing situation arose. Sailors from different countries literally plowed the ocean length and breadth. And the Great Wall, the Japanese “policy of self-isolation” and the inhospitable Sea of ​​Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.”

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuril Islands took place. In the first half of the 18th century, Russian people actively developed the Kuril Islands. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state was not yet able to take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the aborigines, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her highest command, Catherine II freed the “shaggy Kurilians” from all fees and forbade encroaching on their territory. The Cossacks were unable to maintain their power without force, and they abandoned the islands south of Urup. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place with the aim of establishing trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to stall for time and strengthen their position in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a large Japanese expedition to the island of Iturup took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars were installed with the inscription: “Dainihon Erotofu” (Iturup - possession of Japan). The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens the sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their pillars and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, Europeans’ ideas about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuril Islands in the 19th century

In the 18th - early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian researchers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuril Islands by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that “...to the north of Matsmaya (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not expand their possessions further.”

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuril Islands, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin’s mission was supposed to formalize the border between Russia and Japan with an agreement.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant expanses of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.”

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that “the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup,” and Sakhalin was declared “undivided” between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup went to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II for a long time determined Russia’s policy in the Far East, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.”

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in national economic turnover. “The changing situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, was associated with the construction of the Siberian Railway, the construction of which began in 1891. It was planned to run through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the 20th century. The main hub of international contradictions for Russia was the Far East and the most important direction was relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not strive for it. In 1902 and 1903 Intensive negotiations took place between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which led to nothing.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 did Japan declare war on Russia. Japan's treachery caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

A war was forced on Russia that it did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The reasons for general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones included:

• incomplete military-strategic training of the armed forces;
• the significant distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the army and control;
• extremely limited communication network.

The futility of the war was clearly evident by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the Port Arthur fortress on December 20, 1904, few people in Russia believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic uplift gave way to despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the Far Eastern failure, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He undoubtedly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that could only be ensured by a strong geopolitical position, and this was seriously shaken by military failures.”

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the near future it was necessary to immediately begin a peaceful resolution of the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by military-strategic considerations, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: “Japan’s military victories turned it into a leading Far Eastern power, supported by the governments of England and the United States.”

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the lack of previously worked out conditions for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, went to the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation only received instructions not to agree under any circumstances to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede “not an inch of Russian land,” although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough position in Portsmouth, demanding in the form of an ultimatum that Russia completely withdraw from Korea and Manchuria, transfer the Russian Far Eastern fleet, pay indemnity and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of breakdown several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation it was possible to achieve a positive result: on August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in Southern Manchuria, parts of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks about the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements became an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. They looked in many ways like an agreement between equal partners, rather than a treaty concluded after an unsuccessful war.”

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the 1875 exchange agreement and also stated that all Japanese trade agreements with Russia would be nullified as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed back in the 20s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far Eastern Republic under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, NRA units entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the “buffer” republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from where the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.”

By the time of the conclusion of the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Beijing Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of ​​oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “...a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war of the USSR with militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations undertaken at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan...During the 24-day military campaign there was The million-strong Kwantung Army, which was located in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to their heaviest losses. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand prisoners. Japan lost its largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and its most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was unable to conduct an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands, which were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan did not make territorial demands on the Soviet Union. Putting forward such demands was excluded then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to implement all decisions made by the Allied Powers, including decisions concerning its borders. It was during that period that new borders between Japan and the USSR were formed.

The transformation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the South Sakhalin region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document recording Japan's renunciation of rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph “C” in Article 2 it was clearly written: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

However, already during the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this desire did not find open support from other participants and, above all, from the Soviet delegation, as is clear from the text of the agreement given above.

However, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago to Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to one another). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes and then open support for the mentioned territorial claims to our country that US government circles began to provide to Japan - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the context of the further intensification of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military bridgehead in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more tightly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in acquiring the southern Kuril Islands, although such support represented a departure of the United States from the above-mentioned international agreements designed to consolidate the borders established as a result of the Second World War.”

The Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union received many benefits from the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty along with other allied countries participating in the conference. This refusal was motivated by Moscow’s disagreement with the United States’ intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union’s signature on the peace treaty exempted Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, then the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the international community should not give consent to the ownership the Soviet Union, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan renounced these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan's refusal of the Kuril Islands, recorded in the agreement, does not mean its refusal of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the agreement, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuril Islands, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.”

However, at the first glance at Japanese pre-war maps and directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit called “Chishima”.

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it initially seemed, by both sides in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that began, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the Soviet Union’s interest in normalizing relations with Japan in order to achieve territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was about the open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the part where the northern borders of Japan were determined.

From this moment, as I.A. writes. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles took the path of illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders established between both countries as a result of World War II.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest region of the Pacific Ocean in fish resources, as well as other seafood. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide Japanese fishing and other companies with fabulous profits, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest marine fishing areas entirely for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuril Islands under its control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in their hands the keys to the gates leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

Thirdly, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to unite these sections under their ideological control.

And finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the Japanese ruling circles to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit well into the belligerent course of the US government, which was directed sharply against the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, Japan’s advance of territorial demands was viewed by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders established between both countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, Japanese demands could not but meet with resistance from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

Territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were moved from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having encountered a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese came down to the demand for the transfer to Japan only of the southern Kuril Islands, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, which represented the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought to speed up the normalization of relations with Japan at any cost, was revealed. Without a clear idea of ​​the southern Kuril Islands, much less their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them as small bargaining chips. Only this can explain the naive judgment among the Soviet leader that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed if only the Soviet side made a “small concession” to Japanese demands. In those days N.S. Khrushchev imagined that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the negotiations, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan the two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Having willingly accepted this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to persistently seek the transfer of all four South Kuril islands to it. But she was unable to negotiate big concessions then.

Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations", signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “...agreed to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations on concluding a peace treaty. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan." .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's readiness to give up part of its territory in the name of good ties with Japan. It is no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the “transfer” of these islands to Japan, and not about their “return,” as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word “transfer” was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede part of its territory to Japan, and not Japanese territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to present Japan with an advance “gift” in the form of part of Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither the legal nor the moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious over the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy set a course for strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan’s independent role in the Japanese-American “security treaty”, the spearhead of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its willingness to “hand over” two islands to Japan would prompt Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country were also not justified.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon, Japan had a new “argument” in the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the said declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this “argument” was that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, presupposes further negotiations on the “territorial issue” and that the recording in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union’s readiness to transfer to Japan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty the islands of Habomai and Shikotan still does not draw an end to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over two other islands of the southern Kuril Islands: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 50s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called “territorial issue” to fan unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to make adjustments to his assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not meet the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet “security treaty” on January 19, 1960 in Washington, namely on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of Japan’s conclusion of a military treaty, weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “By agreeing to transfer the indicated islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note further stated, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peace-loving intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was then indicated in the cited note, given the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot help ensure that by transferring to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which belong to the USSR, the territory used by foreign troops is expanded. By foreign troops, the note meant the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence on the Japanese islands was secured by a new “security treaty” signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the subsequent months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, indicating the reluctance of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations regarding Japanese territorial claims. From that time on, for a long time, or more precisely, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan became extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in the relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side regarding Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any extensive discussion about Japanese territorial claims .

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side accepted the Soviet Union’s refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at developing the so-called “movement for the return of the northern territories” in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words “northern territories” acquired a very loose content during the development of this “movement”.

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by “northern territories” the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan - all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of far-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the government map office and the Ministry of Education began publicly “correcting” maps and textbooks that began to color the southern Kuril Islands as Japanese territory, causing the Japanese territory to “grow” on these new maps, as the press reported. , 5 thousand square kilometers.

More and more efforts were used to process the country's public opinion and draw as many Japanese as possible into the “movement for the return of the northern territories.” For example, trips to the island of Hokkaido in the area of ​​​​the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, began to be widely practiced by specialized groups of tourists from other parts of the country. The programs of these groups’ stay in the city of Nemuro included “walks” on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril chain with the aim of “sad contemplation” of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the early 1980s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such voyages were counted as “study trips” provided for in school curricula. At Cape Nosapu, located closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, with funds from the government and a number of public organizations, a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built, including a 90-meter observation tower and an “Archival Museum” with a tendentiously selected exhibition designed to convince uninformed visitors in the imaginary historical “validity” of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new development in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to drag the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 70-80s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, on the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called “Northern Territories Days” began to be celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 that a Russian-Japanese treaty was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the “day of the northern territories” was meant to emphasize that the Shimoda Treaty (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) allegedly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during the period that M.S. was in power. Gorbachev. In public statements, there were calls for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that emerged as a result of World War II and for the immediate completion of the territorial dispute with Japan through a “fair compromise,” which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who, during his stay in Tokyo, declared the need to break the Yalta system and speedily transfer to Japan the four southern islands of the Kuril chain.

Following Yu. Afanasyev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. In particular, the “Program for a Five-Stage Resolution of the Territorial Issue,” put forward by the then leader of the interregional group Yeltsin during his visit to Japan in January 1990, was nothing more than a course toward gradual, time-stretched concessions to Japanese territorial demands.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was the “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev’s characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the “Joint Statement” of any language that openly confirmed the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. He also did not refuse the notes from the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, the text of the “Joint Statement” nevertheless included rather ambiguous wording, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.”

Evidence of Gorbachev's inconsistency and instability in protecting the national interests of the USSR was his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to begin reducing the ten thousand military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were stationed "self-defense forces"

Democratic time of the 90s

The August 1991 events in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya agreements, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening the ability of our country to resist the claims of Japan.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin’s arrival in Japan, October 11, 1993, was finally agreed upon, the Tokyo press also began to direct the Japanese public to abandon excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

Events associated with Yeltsin’s continued tenure at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the inconsistency of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of a quick solution to the protracted dispute between the two countries through a “compromise” involving concessions of our country to the Japanese. territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, introduce anything new into the situation that arose at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse in 1994-1999, and neither side could see a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, which was fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became even less likely in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this was the increasing frequency of conflicts in the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, repeated unceremonious intrusions of Japanese poachers into Russian territorial waters were met with harsh rebuff from Russian border guards, who opened fire on border violators.

I.A. speaks about the possibilities of resolving these relations. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should have immediately abandoned the illusion that as soon as Russia ceded the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, ... the Japanese side would immediately benefit our country with large investments, preferential loans, and scientific and technical information. It was precisely this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin’s circle.”

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, “our diplomats and politicians both in Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s times should have abandoned the false assumption that Japanese leaders could in the near future moderate their claims to the southern Kuril Islands and come to some kind of “reasonable compromise” in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as discussed above, the Japanese side never showed, and was unable to show in the future, a desire to renounce its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands.” The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Habomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats for the possibility of persuading the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, based on the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956, were self-deception. It was a good delusion and nothing more.” The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and clear confirmation of the obligation written down in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it the islands of Shikotan and Habomai upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to end its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered establishing control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to taking possession of all four South Kuril islands.

Russia's national interests required in the second half of the 90s that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and, on the contrary, instill in the Japanese side the idea of ​​​​the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward a proposal for “joint economic development” by Russia and Japan of those very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so persistently claimed, which was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone available for business activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “validity” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is annoying: in the Russian proposals, which envisaged wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuril Islands, there was not even an attempt to condition this access on Japan’s consent to the corresponding benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory of the areas of the Japanese island of Hokkaido close to the southern Kuril Islands. And this demonstrated the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve, in negotiations with the Japanese side, equal rights for the two countries in their business activities in each other’s territories. In other words, the idea of ​​“joint economic development” of the southern Kuril Islands turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.”

The Japanese were allowed to conduct private fishing in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant Russian fishing vessels similar rights to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations to ensure that its citizens and vessels comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, ten years of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a “mutually acceptable basis” and sign a bilateral peace treaty between both countries did not lead to any tangible results. The resignation of B. Yeltsin and the accession to the presidency of V.V. Putin alerted the Japanese public.

President of the country V.V. Putin is in fact the only government official authorized by the Constitution to determine the course of Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute between the two countries. His powers were limited by certain articles of the Constitution, and in particular those that obliged the president to “ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory” of the Russian Federation (Article 4), “to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state” (Article 82).

In the late summer of 2002, during his short stay in the Far East, where Putin flew to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the Russian president said only a few words about his country's territorial dispute with Japan. At a meeting with journalists in Vladivostok on August 24, he said that “Japan considers the southern Kuril Islands to be its territory, while we consider them our territory.”

At the same time, he expressed his disagreement with the alarming reports of some Russian media that Moscow is ready to “return” the named islands to Japan. “These are just rumors,” he said, “spread by those who would like to get some benefits from this.”

The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Moscow took place in accordance with previously reached agreements on January 9, 2003. However, Putin’s negotiations with Koizumi did not make any progress in the development of the territorial dispute between the two countries. I.A. Latyshev calls the policy of V.V. Putin is indecisive and evasive, and this policy gives reason to the Japanese public to expect a resolution of the dispute in favor of their country.

The main factors that need to be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands:

• the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
• underdeveloped infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of its own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger transportation;
• proximity and virtually unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
• the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, maintain local energy balance while maintaining the cleanliness of the air and water basins, and protect the unique flora and fauna. The views of the local civilian population must be taken into account when developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands. Those who remain must be guaranteed all rights (including property rights), and those who leave must be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to accept the change in the status of these territories.

The Kuril Islands have important geopolitical and military-strategic significance for Russia and affect Russia’s national security. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. In addition, in the Southern Kuril Islands there is a powerful air defense system and radar systems, fuel depots for refueling aircraft. The Kuril Islands and the adjacent waters are a one-of-a-kind ecosystem with rich natural resources, primarily biological.

The coastal waters of the Southern Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitat areas for valuable commercial species of fish and seafood, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the economy of the Kuril Islands.

It should be noted that at the moment Russia and Japan have signed a program for the joint economic development of the South Kuril Islands. The program was signed in Tokyo in 2000 during the official visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Japan.

“Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands of the Sakhalin region (1994-2005)” in order to ensure the comprehensive socio-economic development of this region as a special economic zone.

Japan believes that concluding a peace treaty with Russia is impossible without determining the ownership of the four South Kuril Islands. This was stated by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this country, Yoriko Kawaguchi, speaking to the public of Sapporo with a speech on Russian-Japanese relations. The Japanese threat hanging over the Kuril Islands and their population still worries the Russian people today.

Illustration copyright RIA Image caption Before Putin and Abe, the issue of signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan was discussed by all their predecessors - to no avail

During a two-day visit to Nagato and Tokyo, the Russian president will agree with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on investments. The main question - the ownership of the Kuril Islands - will, as usual, be postponed indefinitely, experts say.

Abe became the second G7 leader to host Putin after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The visit was supposed to take place two years ago, but was canceled due to sanctions against Russia, supported by Japan.

What is the essence of the dispute between Japan and Russia?

Abe is making progress in a long-standing territorial dispute in which Japan claims the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, as well as the Habomai archipelago (there is no such name in Russia; the archipelago and Shikotan are united under the name of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Japanese elite understands perfectly well that Russia will never return the two large islands, so they are ready to take the maximum - two small ones. But how can we explain to society that they are abandoning large islands forever? Alexander Gabuev, expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center

At the end of World War II, in which Japan fought on the side of Nazi Germany, the USSR expelled 17 thousand Japanese from the islands; A peace treaty was never signed between Moscow and Tokyo.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan established the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but Tokyo and Moscow never agreed on what to mean by the Kuril Islands.

Tokyo considers Iturup, Kunashir and Habomai to be its illegally occupied “northern territories”. Moscow considers these islands part of the Kuril Islands and has repeatedly stated that their current status is not subject to revision.

In 2016, Shinzo Abe flew to Russia twice (to Sochi and Vladivostok), and he and Putin also met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima.

In early December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow and Tokyo have similar positions on the peace treaty. In an interview with Japanese journalists, Vladimir Putin called the lack of a peace treaty with Japan an anachronism that “must be eliminated.”

He also said that the foreign ministries of the two countries need to resolve “purely technical issues” between themselves so that the Japanese have the opportunity to visit the southern Kuril Islands without visas.

However, Moscow is embarrassed that if the southern Kuril Islands are returned, US military bases may appear there. The head of the National Security Council of Japan, Shotaro Yachi, did not rule out this possibility in a conversation with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, the Japanese newspaper Asahi wrote on Wednesday.

Should we wait for the Kuriles to return?

The short answer is no. “We should not expect any breakthrough agreements, or even ordinary ones, on the issue of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands,” says former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze.

“The expectations of the Japanese side, as usual, are at odds with Russia’s intentions,” Kunadze said in an interview with the BBC. “President Putin, in the last days before leaving for Japan, repeatedly said that for Russia the problem of belonging to the Kuril Islands does not exist, that the Kuril Islands are , in essence, a military trophy following the results of the Second World War, and even that Russia’s rights to the Kuril Islands are secured by international treaties.”

The latter, according to Kunadze, is a controversial issue and depends on the interpretation of these treaties.

“Putin is referring to the agreements reached in Yalta in February 1945. These agreements were of a political nature and required appropriate legal formalization. It took place in San Francisco in 1951. The Soviet Union did not sign a peace treaty with Japan at that time. Therefore “, there is no other consolidation of Russia’s rights in the territories that Japan renounced under the San Francisco Treaty,” the diplomat sums up.

“The parties are trying to deflate the public’s mutual expectations as much as possible and show that a breakthrough will not happen,” comments Carnegie Moscow Center expert Alexander Gabuev.

“Russia’s red line: Japan recognizes the results of World War II, renounces claims to the southern Kuril Islands. As a gesture of goodwill, we are transferring two small islands to Japan, and on Kunashir and Iturup we can make visa-free entry, a free zone for joint economic development - everything that whatever,” he believes. “Russia cannot give up two large islands, because it will be a loss, these islands are of economic importance, a lot of money has been invested there, there is a large population, the straits between these islands are used by Russian submarines when they go out to patrol the Pacific Ocean.” .

Japan, according to Gabuev’s observations, has softened its position on the disputed territories in recent years.

“The Japanese elite understands perfectly well that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how can they explain to society that they are abandoning the large islands forever? Japan is looking for options in which it takes the small ones and retains its claim to big. For Russia this is unacceptable, we want to resolve the issue once and for all. These two red lines are not yet so close that a breakthrough can be expected,” the expert believes.

What else will be discussed?

The Kuril Islands are not the only topic that Putin and Abe discuss. Russia needs foreign investment in the Far East.

According to the Japanese publication Yomiuri, trade turnover between the two countries has decreased due to sanctions. Thus, imports from Russia to Japan decreased by 27.3% - from 2.61 trillion yen ($23 billion) in 2014 to 1.9 trillion yen ($17 billion) in 2015. And exports to Russia increased by 36.4% - from 972 billion yen ($8.8 billion) in 2014 to 618 billion yen ($5.6 billion) in 2015.

The Japanese government intends, through the state oil, gas and metals corporation JOGMEC, to acquire part of the gas fields of the Russian company Novatek, as well as part of the shares of Rosneft.

It is expected that dozens of commercial agreements will be signed during the visit, and the working breakfast of the Russian President and the Japanese Prime Minister will be attended, in particular, by the head of Rosatom Alexey Likhachev, the head of Gazprom Alexey Miller, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin, the head of the Russian Direct Fund investments Kirill Dmitriev, entrepreneurs Oleg Deripaska and Leonid Mikhelson.

So far, Russia and Japan are only exchanging pleasantries. Based on whether at least part of the economic memoranda is implemented, it will become clear whether they can still agree on something.

Disputes about the four South Kuril Islands, which currently belong to the Russian Federation, have been going on for quite some time. As a result of agreements and wars signed at different times, this land changed hands several times. Currently, these islands are the cause of an unresolved territorial dispute between Russia and Japan.

Discovery of the islands

The issue of the discovery of the Kuril Islands is controversial. According to the Japanese side, the Japanese were the first to set foot on the islands in 1644. A map of that time with the designations marked on it - “Kunashiri”, “Etorofu”, etc. is carefully preserved in the National Museum of Japan. And Russian pioneers, the Japanese believe, first came to the Kuril ridge only during the time of Tsar Peter I, in 1711, and on the Russian map of 1721 these islands are called “Japanese Islands”.

But in reality the situation is different: firstly, the Japanese received the first information about the Kuril Islands (from the Ainu language - “kuru” means “a person who came from nowhere”) from the local Ainu residents (the oldest non-Japanese population of the Kuril Islands and the Japanese Islands) during an expedition to Hokkaido in 1635. Moreover, the Japanese did not reach the Kuril lands themselves due to constant conflicts with the local population.

It should be noted that the Ainu were hostile to the Japanese, and initially treated the Russians well, considering them their “brothers”, due to the similarity in appearance and methods of communication between the Russians and small nations.

Secondly, the Kuril Islands were discovered by the Dutch expedition of Maarten Gerritsen de Vries (Fries) in 1643, the Dutch were looking for the so-called. "Golden Lands" The Dutch did not like the lands, and they sold their detailed description and map to the Japanese. It was on the basis of Dutch data that the Japanese compiled their maps.

Thirdly, the Japanese at that time did not control not only the Kuril Islands, but even Hokkaido; only their stronghold was in its southern part. The Japanese began conquering the island at the beginning of the 17th century, and the fight against the Ainu continued for two centuries. That is, if the Russians were interested in expansion, then Hokkaido could become a Russian island. This was made easier by the good attitude of the Ainu towards the Russians and their hostility towards the Japanese. There are also records of this fact. The Japanese state of that time did not officially consider itself the sovereign of not only Sakhalin and the Kuril lands, but also Hokkaido (Matsumae) - this was confirmed in a circular by the head of the Japanese government, Matsudaira, during Russian-Japanese negotiations on the border and trade in 1772.

Fourthly, Russian explorers visited the islands before the Japanese. In the Russian state, the first mention of the Kuril lands dates back to 1646, when Nekhoroshko Ivanovich Kolobov gave a report to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich about the campaigns of Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin and spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the Kuril Islands. In addition, Dutch, Scandinavian and German medieval chronicles and maps report about the first Russian settlements in the Kuril Islands at that time. The first reports about the Kuril lands and their inhabitants reached the Russians in the middle of the 17th century.

In 1697, during the expedition of Vladimir Atlasov to Kamchatka, new information about the islands appeared; the Russians explored the islands as far as Simushir (an island in the middle group of the Great Ridge of the Kuril Islands).

XVIII century

Peter I knew about the Kuril Islands; in 1719, the tsar sent a secret expedition to Kamchatka under the leadership of Ivan Mikhailovich Evreinov and Fyodor Fedorovich Luzhin. Marine surveyor Evreinov and surveyor-cartographer Luzhin had to determine whether there was a strait between Asia and America. The expedition reached the island of Simushir in the south and brought local residents and rulers to swear allegiance to the Russian state.

In 1738-1739, the navigator Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg (Danish by origin) walked along the entire Kuril ridge, put all the islands he encountered on the map, including the entire Lesser Kuril ridge (these are 6 large and a number of small islands that are separated from the Great Kuril ridge in the South -Kuril Strait). He explored the lands as far as Hokkaido (Matsumaya), bringing the local Ainu rulers to swear allegiance to the Russian state.

Subsequently, the Russians avoided voyages to the southern islands and developed the northern territories. Unfortunately, at this time, abuses against the Ainu were noted not only by the Japanese, but also by the Russians.

In 1771, the Lesser Kuril Ridge was removed from Russia and came under the protectorate of Japan. The Russian authorities sent the nobleman Antipin with the translator Shabalin to rectify the situation. They were able to persuade the Ainu to restore Russian citizenship. In 1778-1779, Russian envoys brought more than 1.5 thousand people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Hokkaido into citizenship. In 1779, Catherine II freed those who had accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes.

In 1787, the “Extensive Land Description of the Russian State...” contained a list of the Kuril Islands up to Hokkaido-Matsumaya, the status of which had not yet been determined. Although the Russians did not control the lands south of Urup Island, the Japanese were active there.

In 1799, by order of seii-taishogun Tokugawa Ienari, he headed the Tokugawa Shogunate, two outposts were built on Kunashir and Iturup, and permanent garrisons were placed there. Thus, the Japanese secured the status of these territories within Japan by military means.

Treaty

In 1845, the Empire of Japan unilaterally declared its power over all of Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge. This naturally caused a violent negative reaction from the Russian Emperor Nicholas I. But the Russian Empire did not have time to take action; the events of the Crimean War prevented it. Therefore, it was decided to make concessions and not bring matters to war.

On February 7, 1855, the first diplomatic agreement was concluded between Russia and Japan - Treaty of Shimoda. It was signed by Vice Admiral E.V. Putyatin and Toshiakira Kawaji. According to Article 9 of the treaty, “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan” were established. Japan ceded the islands from Iturup and to the south, Sakhalin was declared a joint, indivisible possession. Russians in Japan received consular jurisdiction, Russian ships received the right to enter the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki. The Russian Empire received most favored nation treatment in trade with Japan and received the right to open consulates in ports open to Russians. That is, in general, especially considering the difficult international situation of Russia, the agreement can be assessed positively. Since 1981, the Japanese have celebrated the day of signing the Shimoda Treaty as “Northern Territories Day.”

It should be noted that in fact, the Japanese received the right to the “Northern Territories” only for “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia,” most favored nation treatment in trade relations. Their further actions de facto annulled this agreement.

Initially, the provision of the Shimoda Treaty on joint ownership of Sakhalin Island was more beneficial for the Russian Empire, which was actively colonizing this territory. The Japanese Empire did not have a good navy, so at that time it did not have such an opportunity. But later the Japanese began to intensively populate the territory of Sakhalin, and the question of its ownership began to become increasingly controversial and acute. The contradictions between Russia and Japan were resolved by signing the St. Petersburg Treaty.

St. Petersburg Treaty. It was signed in the capital of the Russian Empire on April 25 (May 7), 1875. Under this agreement, the Empire of Japan transferred Sakhalin to Russia as full ownership, and in exchange received all the islands of the Kuril chain.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and Treaty of Portsmouth On August 23 (September 5), 1905, the Russian Empire, according to Article 9 of the agreement, ceded southern Sakhalin to Japan, south of 50 degrees north latitude. Article 12 contained an agreement to conclude a convention on Japanese fishing along the Russian shores of the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk and Bering.

After the death of the Russian Empire and the beginning of foreign intervention, the Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin and participated in the occupation of the Far East. When the Bolshevik Party won the Civil War, Japan did not want to recognize the USSR for a long time. Only after the Soviet authorities canceled the status of the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok in 1924 and in the same year the USSR was recognized by Great Britain, France and China, the Japanese authorities decided to normalize relations with Moscow.

Beijing Treaty. On February 3, 1924, official negotiations between the USSR and Japan began in Beijing. Only on January 20, 1925, the Soviet-Japanese convention on the basic principles of relations between countries was signed. The Japanese pledged to withdraw their forces from the territory of Northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925. The declaration of the USSR government, which was attached to the convention, emphasized that the Soviet government did not share with the former government of the Russian Empire political responsibility for the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905. In addition, the convention enshrined the agreement of the parties that all agreements, treaties and conventions concluded between Russia and Japan before November 7, 1917, except for the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, should be revised.

In general, the USSR made great concessions: in particular, Japanese citizens, companies and associations were granted the rights to exploit natural raw materials throughout the Soviet Union. On July 22, 1925, a contract was signed to grant the Japanese Empire a coal concession, and on December 14, 1925, an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin. Moscow agreed to this agreement in order to stabilize the situation in the Russian Far East, since the Japanese supported the White Guards outside the USSR. But in the end, the Japanese began to systematically violate the convention and create conflict situations.

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that took place in the spring of 1941 regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty, the Soviet side raised the issue of liquidating Japan's concessions in Northern Sakhalin. The Japanese gave their written consent to this, but delayed the implementation of the agreement for 3 years. Only when the USSR began to gain the upper hand over the Third Reich did the Japanese government implement the agreement that had been given earlier. Thus, on March 30, 1944, a Protocol was signed in Moscow on the destruction of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the transfer of all Japanese concession property to the Soviet Union.

February 11, 1945 at the Yalta conference three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain - reached a verbal agreement on the USSR's entry into the war with the Japanese Empire on the terms of the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge to it after the end of World War II.

In the Potsdam Declaration dated July 26, 1945, it was stated that Japanese sovereignty would be limited only to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and other smaller islands, which would be designated by the victorious countries. The Kuril Islands were not mentioned.

After the defeat of Japan, on January 29, 1946, Memorandum No. 677 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, American General Douglas MacArthur, excluded the Chishima Islands (Kuril Islands), the Habomadze group of islands (Habomai) and the Sikotan Island (Shikotan) from Japanese territory.

According to San Francisco Peace Treaty dated September 8, 1951, the Japanese side renounced all rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. But the Japanese claim that Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Habomai (islands of the Lesser Kuril Islands) were not part of the Chishima Islands (Kuril Islands) and they did not abandon them.

Further agreements

Joint Declaration. On October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted a Joint Declaration. The document ended the state of war between the countries and restored diplomatic relations, and also spoke of Moscow’s consent to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to the Japanese side. But they were supposed to be handed over only after the signing of a peace treaty. However, later Japan was forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty with the USSR. The United States threatened not to give up Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu Archipelago to the Japanese if they renounced their claims to the other islands of the Lesser Kuril chain.

After Tokyo signed the Cooperation and Security Treaty with Washington in January 1960, extending the American military presence on the Japanese Islands, Moscow announced that it refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to the Japanese side. The statement was justified by the security issue of the USSR and China.

In 1993 it was signed Tokyo Declaration about Russian-Japanese relations. It stated that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR and recognizes the 1956 agreement. Moscow expressed its readiness to begin negotiations regarding Japan's territorial claims. In Tokyo this was assessed as a sign of impending victory.

In 2004, the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, made a statement that Moscow recognizes the 1956 Declaration and is ready to negotiate a peace treaty based on it. In 2004-2005, this position was confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the Japanese insisted on the transfer of 4 islands, so the issue was not resolved. Moreover, the Japanese gradually increased their pressure; for example, in 2009, the head of the Japanese government at a government meeting called the Lesser Kuril Ridge “illegally occupied territories.” In 2010 and early 2011, the Japanese became so excited that some military experts began to talk about the possibility of a new Russian-Japanese war. Only the spring natural disaster - the consequences of a tsunami and a terrible earthquake, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant - cooled Japan's ardor.

As a result, the loud statements of the Japanese led to Moscow declaring that the islands are the territory of the Russian Federation legally following the Second World War, this is enshrined in the UN Charter. And Russian sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which has the appropriate international legal confirmation, is beyond doubt. Plans were also announced to develop the islands' economy and strengthen Russia's military presence there.

Strategic importance of the islands

Economic factor. The islands are economically underdeveloped, but they have deposits of valuable and rare earth metals - gold, silver, rhenium, titanium. The waters are rich in biological resources; the seas that wash the shores of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands are among the most productive areas of the World Ocean. The shelves, where hydrocarbon deposits are found, are also of great importance.

Political factor. The cession of the islands will sharply lower Russia’s status in the world, and there will be a legal opportunity to review other results of the Second World War. For example, they may demand that the Kaliningrad region be given to Germany or part of Karelia to Finland.

Military factor. The transfer of the South Kuril Islands will provide the Japanese and US naval forces with free access to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. It will allow our potential adversaries to exercise control over strategically important strait zones, which will sharply worsen the deployment capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet, including nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This will be a strong blow to the military security of the Russian Federation.